










RICH, POOR AND GROWTH-MIRACLE NATIONS: 
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA REVISITED* 
 






Corresponding author: Lilia Maliar, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, 
Universidad de Alicante, Campus San Vicente del Raspeig, Ap. Correos 99, 03080 Alicante, 




Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Primera Edición Octubre 2004. 
 




IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 






                                                 
* We thank Lola Guilló and Fidel Pérez for valuable comments. This research was supported by the 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the EERC Consortium and the Ministerio de Ciencia 
y Tecnología de España, the Ramón y Cajal program and BEC 2001-0535. 
** D. Kylymnyuk: University of Toulouse. L. and S. Maliar, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis 
Económico, Universidad de Alicante, Campus San Vicente del Raspeig, Ap. Correos 99, 03080 Alicante, 
Spain. E-mail: maliarl@merlin.fae.ua.es  
 
RICH, POOR AND GROWTH-MIRACLE NATIONS: MULTIPLE 
EQUILIBRIA REVISITED 
 










  This paper presents a two-sector growth model of international trade that can 
account for the key features of the postwar world development experience. Two sectors 
represent the traditional primitive production and the modern sophisticated production. 
Due to increasing returns in the modern sector, the open-economy version of our model 
gives rise to three different equilibria: one in which the country produces only primitive 
goods and converges to a low-income steady state; another in which it produces both 
primitive and sophisticated goods and converges to the world-average steady state; and 
a third in which it specializes in the production of sophisticated goods and converges to 
a balanced growth path. We argue that the development experiences of poor, rich and 
growth-miracle countries are well described by these three equilibria. 
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growth miracles, coordination proble 1 Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to develop a uniﬁed theory that accounts for the
main features of the postwar world development experience. The regularities
that we observe in the data and that we try to reproduce are as follows:
The typical rich country has a relatively large industrial sector and a rela-
tively small agricultural sector, a sectorial composition that becomes stable
over time. Rich countries have generally been rich for quite a long time and
now continue growing at relatively moderate rates. Some rich countries are
large while others are small. The typical poor country, on the other hand,
specializes in the primitive natural-resource-based production and exchanges
its primitive products (agriculture, food, fuel, ore, etc.) for more sophis-
ticated products (manufactured goods) on the international market. Most
of the poor countries have been poor for a long time and continue to have
small positive or even negative growth rates. However, some of the countries
that were poor in 1950s have started to grow at very high rates. The pe-
riod of fast growth in such growth-miracle countries has been accompanied
by a dramatic increase in their industrial sectors (especially, in machinery
and high-tech) relative to that of agriculture. Over the postwar period, the
growth-miracle countries changed their international specialization, becom-
ing importers of primitive goods and large-scale exporters of manufactured
goods of increasing sophistication.
Our theory, aimed at explaining the above empirical regularities, is built
around a dynamic two-sector growth model of international trade. The ﬁrst
sector produces a primitive commodity by using a constant returns-to-scale
technology with two inputs, capital and natural resources, with the latter
i n p u tb e i n ga v a i l a b l ea taﬁxed level. The second sector produces a sophisti-
cated commo di ty from capi tal and primitive commo dities; i ts technology has
increasing returns in the early development stages (due to learning-by-doingand knowledge externalities), and it has constant returns in its later develop-
ment stages (due to bounded externalities). Only sophisticated commodities
can be used for consumption and investment. We consider two diﬀerent vari-
ants of our economy, the autarkic and the open-economy versions. In the
latter case, we assume that both primitive and sophisticated goods are trad-
able on the international market and that the economy is small in economic
terms, so that it does not aﬀect world prices.
In the autarkic version of our economy, long-run growth is impossible.
Since the amount of natural resources is ﬁxed, there are decreasing returns to
scale in the production of primitive goods, and since primitive goods are used
as an input for producing sophisticated goods, there are also asymptotically
decreasing returns to scale in the production of sophisticated goods, which
implies that the autarkic economy converges to a steady state.
The open-economy version of our model gives rise to three diﬀerent equi-
libria, which are referred to here as the ”poverty-trap”, the ”autarky-like”
and the ”growth-miracle” equilibria. In the poverty-trap equilibrium, the
country produces only primitive goods and trades them for sophisticated
goods on international market; it converges to a steady state with con-
sumption (welfare), which is lower than that of the autarkic economy. Fur-
thermore, in the autarky-like equilibrium, the open economy produces both
primitive and sophisticated commodities; it mimics the behavior of the au-
tarkic economy and converges to the same steady state as the autarkic econ-
omy does. Finally, in the growth-miracle equilibrium, the country produces
mainly sophisticated goods and trades them for primitive goods on interna-
tional market; it converges to a balanced growth path with an asymptotically
constant growth rate. Long-run growth is possible for a small open economy
because it can buy primitive goods at a constant world price and thus, has
constant returns to the production of sophisticated goods. We argue that
the postwar development experience of poor, rich and fast-growing countriesis well described by the three equilibria we have constructed.1
When choosing equilibrium, the agents face a coordination problem. In
particular, because the production of sophisticated goods would be unprof-
itable for an individual investor if no other investors entered this sector, but
it would be proﬁtable if enough investors do so.2 Therefore, according to our
theory, countries that perform well are those that succeed in coordinating
on achieving a good equilibrium. We show that a larger capital endowment
or richer natural resources can facilitate convergence to a good equilibrium.
However, even under the most favorable initial conditions, a country can get
stuck in a bad equilibrium forever. We argue that the government is the
natural candidate for the coordinating task. In fact, empirical evidence indi-
cates that government policies inducing simultaneous entry of producers into
the sophisticated-goods sector, played a crucial role in the economic success
of the actual growth-miracle countries.
Our model combines several features that have been repeatedly referred
to in the literature as being important in explaining the determinants of
the economic growth and prosperity of nations. First of all, our model is
similar to Variable-Returns-to Scale (VRS) models of international trade, in
its assumption of increasing returns to scale in one of the two production
sectors.3 This assumption leads to multiple solutions in our model, as it
does in the typical VRS setup.4 Our model is particularly close to the one in
Matsuyama (1992), however, there is an important diﬀerence between the two
1The presence of multiple equilibria has long been used in the literature to explain
wide income diﬀerences across countries. As was advocated by Lucas (1993, p. 269), ”If
our objective is to understand a world in which similarly situated economies follow very
diﬀerent paths, these theoretical features [multiplicities] are advantageous”.
2A similar mechanism lies in the basis of the model of industrialization by Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989). See also Rodrick (2003) for a discussion of the literature
where coordination failures are induced by increasing returns to scale, as is in our case.
3See Choi and Yu (2002) for a review of the VRS trade literature.
4See Kemp and Schweinberger (1991) for a discussion on the multiplicity of equilibria
in the VRS class of models.models: we explicitly consider intertemporal capital accumulation, whereas
Matsuyama (1992) assumes that the capital input is ﬁxed.5 Thus, unlike the
previous VRS models, which either have no engine of long-run growth and
predict convergence to a steady state (as in, e.g., Graham and Temple, 2003)
or have an exogenous engine of long-run growth (as in Matsuyama, 1992),
our model can generate balanced endogenous long-run growth.6
Furthermore, in the growth-miracle equilibrium, our economy is similar to
Hansen and Prescott’s (2002) economy which evolves from agriculture, with a
decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, to industry with AK technology. We
diﬀer from Hansen and Prescott (2002) in several respects. They focus on
the closed-economy case, assume that the goods produced by the two sectors
are perfect substitutes and do not consider externalities, which implies that
there is a unique equilibrium where industry is always opened as soon as
enough capital is accumulated. In contrast, we concentrate mainly on the
open-economy case, assume that the output of one sector is used as the
input for the other, and we have multiple equilibria, due to the presence of
externalities, which implies that opening of the sophisticated-goods sector is
not guaranteed in general.
Finally, our model is closely related to the dynamic neoclassical Heckscher-
Ohlin models of comparative advantage, considered in Ventura (1997) and
Atkeson and Kehoe (2000). We share with Ventura (1997) the mechanism for
making a miracle, i.e., the implication that a small open economy that faces
constant world prices can behave as if it had a linear technology. However,
in contrast to Ventura (1997), who generates diﬀering economic performance
5Matsuyama (1992, p. 330) admits that neglecting capital accumulation is "probably
the most serious omission" of his analysis.
6Our model is also related to closed-economy models of industrialization where there
exist multiple equilibria due to increasing returns in the industrial sector; see, e.g., Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Matsuyama (1991). However, those models do not generate
endogenous long-run growth either.of simultaneously developing countries by assuming ex-ante heterogeneity
(in, e.g., rental rates, relative productivities of sectors, subjective rates of
preferences across countries), we have cross-country diﬀerences due to the
multiplicity of equilibria, even if all of the countries are ex-ante identical.
We share with Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) the assumption that countries dif-
fer in their timing of development. To be more speciﬁc, we assume that a
small open economy begins to develop when the rest of the world has al-
ready developed. However, our conclusions regarding the destiny of a small
late-blooming country is diﬀerent from that of Atkeson and Kehoe (2000):
their model predicts that late-blooming countries necessarily converge to a
lower level of output per capita than early-blooming countries do, whereas
our analysis suggests that late-blooming countries can converge either to a
steady state with lower output than early-blooming countries do, or to a
steady state with the same output as early-blooming countries do, or to a
balanced growth path.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we describe the empir-
ical relationship between the sectorial composition, international trade and
economic growth. In Section 3, we present the model and characterize its
implications, and we argue that the predictions of our model are consistent
with actual world development. In Section 4, we discuss some factors that
determine the equilibrium choice, and ﬁnally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2 Sectorial composition, international trade
and economic growth: the stylized facts
In this section, we investigate the relationship between sectorial composition,
international trade and economic growth by performing a cross-country com-
parison. We use the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2000) data
set, which contains relevant information for the period 1960-1999. For ourstudy, we select a sample of 100 countries for which the data on GDP are
available for at least the entire period 1965-1994. In the ranges 1960-1964
and 1995-1999, several values were missing for the GDP of such countries
as Canada, Malta, Oman, Puerto Rico and Congo D. R. We restored the
missing values by a linear extrapolation of a logged GDP on a constant and
time trend. We provide a list of the countries in our sample in Table 1.F u r -
thermore, for both the ﬁrst year, 1960, and the last year, 1999, we report
each country’s size (deﬁned as its share of the total GDP of the sample), its
GDP per capita and its rank according to GDP per capita. Finally, we pro-
vide each country’s cumulative GDP growth rate over the 1960-1999 period
(deﬁned as the ratio of GDP in 1999 to that in 1960) and its rank according
to the cumulative growth rate of the GDP.
We use the constructed rankings to distinguish three groups of countries:
a group of ”rich” countries which is composed of the top ten countries in the
sample by the level of GDP in 1999 (Luxembourg, Switzerland, Japan, Nor-
way, Denmark, Austria, U.S., Iceland, Netherlands and Finland); the group
of ”fast-growing” countries which includes the top ten countries in the cumu-
lative GDP growth over the 1960-1999 period (Botswana, Singapore, South
Korea, Malta, Oman, Hong Kong, China, Thailand, Japan and Malaysia)
and the group of ”poor” countries which consists of the bottom ten countries
in the level of GDP for 1999 (Nigeria, Madagascar, Rwanda, Chad, Nepal,
Niger, Malawi, Sierra Leona, Burundi and Congo D.R.). Given that six out
of the ten poorest countries belong to the group of the ten slowest-growing
countries, (speciﬁcally, Madagascar, Rwanda, Chad, Niger, Sierra Leona and
Congo D.R.), we shall not distinguish between the groups of poor and slow-
growing countries, but rather focus exclusively on the former group. In Table
2, we report the key statistics on the GDP and export for our three groups of
countries as well as for the whole sample (the shares are the averages over the
1990-1999 period and the growth rates are the averages for 1960-1999). Asa test for robustness, we also report the same set of statistics by increasing
the size of the rich, fast-growing and poor groups from ten to twenty. In
Table 3, we provide evidence on the composition of international trade, by
products, for our set of countries obtained from the World Factbook (2002).
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, we draw, respectively, the shares of industry and agri-
culture in GDP, the sectorial composition of manufacturing and the sectorial
composition of export, for the three groups of countries distinguished.7
We summarize the tendencies observed in the data below.
1. The richest countries are not the ones with the highest growth rates,
and the fast-growing countries are not particularly rich.
2. In general, fast-growing countries are small. Rich countries may be
either large or small.
3. The rich countries have large industrial sectors and small agricultural
sectors, and the poor countries have large agricultural sectors and small
industrial sector. The shares of industry and agriculture in both the
rich and poor countries are stable over time. The fast-growing countries
ﬁrst had large agricultural sectors and small industrial sectors, as the
poor countries do. Over the subsequent period of fast growth, the fast-
growing countries experienced a dramatic reduction of their agricultural
sectors and a great expansion of their industrial sectors.
4. For the rich countries, the largest component of manufacturing is ma-
chinery, whereas for the poor countries, it is food (and the smallest
7Whenever data for a country is unavailable, we replace such a country in Figures 1-3
with its nearest out-of-group neighbor for which data is available. As a result, in some
ﬁgures, we have the series for Belgium, Finland and Burkina Faso, which according to
GDP in 1999, occupy the 11th, 12th and 90th places, respectively. Furthermore, given
that Japan enters both the rich and the fast-growing groups, we replace it with Indonesia,
which is the 13th fast-growing country.component is machinery). For the fast-growing countries, the share of
machinery in manufacturing was initially small but increased dramati-
cally over the period of fast growth.
5. The poor countries are heavy net exporters of primary products (i.e.,
fuel, ore, food and agriculture) and net importers of highly elaborated
products (manufacturing). The rich countries do not have a pronounced
pattern of international trade. The fast-growing countries increase the
share of manufacturing in their net exports over the period of fast
growth. In particular, the fast-growing countries have the highest share
of high-tech export in GDP.
Let us discuss the above stylized facts in greater detail. As far as Fact 1 is
concerned, the growth-rates ranking among the ten richest countries are 21,
59, 9, 18, 45, 27, 44, 26, 41 and 25, respectively (see Table 1 ). The average
growth rate of the rich group is 2.78%, which is much lower than the growth
rate of the fast-growing group, 5.52% (see Table 2 ). In turn, the ranks by
GDP per capita in 1999 of the ten fast-growing countries are 45, 14, 28, 29,
35, 17, 72, 50, 3 and 41, respectively. In 1960, the GDP per capita of the
fast-growing group was about twice as low as the sample average and more
than six times as low as that of the rich group. As a result of their continuous
fast growth, in 1999, the GDP per capita of the fast-growing group surpasses
that of the sample average, but is still about three times as low as that of
the rich group. In fact, there is only one country, Japan, which belongs to
both the rich and the fast-growing groups.
As regards Fact 2, the sizes of seven out of ten fast-growing countries, such
as Botswana, Singapore, Malta, Oman, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia
were less than 20% of the sample average in 1960, and remain far below
the sample average in 1999 in spite of their continued economic growth (see
Table 1 ). South Korea and China had their initial sizes comparable to thesample average (48% and 113%, respectively) and increased their sizes to
187% and 330%, respectively, in 1999. Japan is the only serious exception
to the general rule: it was about ten times larger than the sample average in
1960, and it almost doubles its relative size in 1999. Furthermore, our rich
group is composed of six countries whose sizes are about average in both 1960
and 1999 (Norway, Finland, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland), of
two very large countries (Japan and the U.S), and of two very small countries
(Luxembourg and Iceland). Thus, the size of the typical fast-growing country
is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of the typical rich country.
The tendencies listed in Fact 3 are illustrated in Figure 1 and are quan-
tiﬁed in Table 2. As can be seen from the table, the shares of industry in
GDP for the rich, fast-growing and poor groups are about 27.9%, 40.5%
and 22.1%, respectively, whereas the shares of agriculture in GDP for these
groups are about 3.8%, 6.8% and 37.2%, respectively. (The ﬁgures for the
shares of labor employed in industry and in agriculture are quite similar).
Furthermore, in the fast-growing countries, the growth rate for industry is
7.7%, which is remarkably higher than it is for either the rich or the poor
countries, 2.2% and 0.9%, respectively. The growth rates for agriculture are,
in general, low and do not diﬀer substantially among the fast-growing, rich
or poor groups, amounting to 0.7%, 0.7% and 0%, respectively. In Figure 1,
we observe few exceptions to the regularities in Fact 3.S p e c i ﬁcally, for such
fast-growing countries as Singapore, Malta and Hong-Kong, the agricultural
sector had always been nearly zero because of their poor endowment of land.
In Congo D.R., the share of agriculture was initially smaller than that of
industry, however, it increased over the last decade and currently exceeds
the share of industry.
The regularities in Fact 4 can be readily seen from Figure 2 and Table
2. In particular, it follows from the table that the growth rate of machinery
in the fast-growing countries was 18.3%, which is much higher than that int h er i c hc o u n t r i e s ,w h e r ei ti s3 . 0 % . C u r r e n t l y ,t h es h a r eo fm a c h i n e r yi n
GDP in the fast-growing countries is almost twice as much as it is in the rich
countries. In the poor group, machinery was also growing at a high rate of
12.4%. However, given that, initially, this sector was almost non-existent,
its share in GDP still represents just 0.8%. It is interesting to note that the
evolution of machinery in Japan is quite characteristic for both rich and fast-
growing countries: machinery was the largest part of manufacturing sector
in Japan, as it is in the rich countries, and it has been growing rapidly, as
it is in the fast-growing countries. This substantiates the fact that Japan
belongs to both the rich and the fast-growing groups.
To appreciate the composition of the exports and imports of the diﬀerent
countries listed in Fact 5,w es h a l ll o o ka tFigure 3, Table 2 and Table 3.
Regarding the rich group, we observe that some countries, like Luxembourg,
Switzerland, Japan and Finland are net exporters of manufactured goods
and importers of primary goods; other countries that are particularly rich
in certain primary goods, like Denmark (ﬁsh, meat), Norway (petroleum),
Iceland (ﬁsh) and Netherlands (food), are importers of manufactured goods
and exporters of primary goods; ﬁnally, Austria and the U.S. are currently
importers of both primary and manufactured goods (see Figure 3 and Table
3). The fact that the fast-growing countries experienced a large expansion in
the export of manufactured goods over the last two decades can be observed
from Figure 3: initially, such countries as China, Thailand, Malaysia and
Indonesia were importers of manufactured goods and are now net exporters;
and South Korea increased its share of net exports of manufactured goods
in its GDP, from 7% to 20%. In particular, the gross export of high-tech
products in the fast-growing group is 7.58% of their GDP, which is much
higher than the respective numbers for the rich and the poor groups, 2.78%
and 0.04%, respectively. (Unfortunately, we do not have data on net export
of high-tech products). Finally, there is a very clear pattern of internationaltrade for the poor countries which export such primary goods as cotton, live-
stock, coﬀee, tea, carpets, tobacco, sugar, peanuts, petroleum or diamonds in
exchange for capital goods, machinery, equipment and foodstuﬀs( s e eTable
3). The quantitative expression of the tendency is well-illustrated by the
ﬁgures shown in Table 2 : the poor group has net import of manufacturing
of over 17% and net export of primary goods of 10% of their GDP.
Some of these empirical facts have been documented in previous devel-
opment literature. For example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) con-
sider the ten fastest-growers and the ten slowest-growers and analyze their
growth rates relative to the average during the 1960-1985 period. Further,
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997) focus on the eﬀect of structural change
on economic dynamics in 123 countries in the period 1970-1989 and ﬁnd that
an increase in per capita income leads to a decrease in the share of agricul-
tural output and to an increase in the share of manufactured output in total
GDP.
3T h e m o d e l
In this section, we describe a two-sector economy and derive the equilibrium
conditions. Subsequently, we consider two diﬀerent variants of our economy,
the autarkic and the open-economy.
3.1 A two-sector economy
Time is continuous, and the horizon is inﬁnite. The consumer side of the
economy consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents with their names
on a closed interval [0,1]. As a result, average and aggregate quantities
coincide in our model. The producer side of the economy is composed of
two sectors: the primitive-goods sector and the sophisticated-goods sector,
denoted by superscripts ”p”a n d” s”, respectively.An agent owns capital and natural resources and rents them to the pro-
duction ﬁrms. Natural resources do not depreciate and stay constant over
time. The capital stock in both primitive- and sophisticated-goods sectors
depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0,1]. The agent spends the period’s income
on consumption and investment in both sectors. Only sophisticated goods





































t, are, respectively, investment, capital and
interest rate in a sector j ∈ {p,s}; N and qt denote natural resources and
their price, respectively. Dots over k
p
t and ks
t represent diﬀerentiation with
respect to time.
The consumer has a period utility function of the Constant Relative











































where the initial condition (k
p
0,ks
0) is given. Here, ρ > 0 is the discount rate;
σ > 0 is the utility function parameter; kt is the aggregate capital stock,
kt = k s
t + k 
p
t ; budget constrai nt (5) follows from (1)− (3 );andﬁnally,
(7) is a no Ponzi game condition.
The primitive-goods sector consists of a representative ﬁrm that owns con-









where B>0 and β ∈ (0,1).T h eﬁrm maximizes period-by-period proﬁts by
choosing the demand for capital and natural resources:
π
p
















where pt is the price of the primitive good (the price of the sophisticated
good is normalized to one).
The sophisticated-goods sector is composed of a representative ﬁrm, whose
production technology has constant returns to scale in private inputs and is









where ϕt is the size of spillovers; zt is the amount of primitive goods produced;
A>0;a n dα ∈ (0,1).T h e ﬁrm maximizes its period-by-period proﬁtb y
taking ϕt, rs
t and pt as given:
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s
















We assume that the size of spillovers ϕt is determined by the sector’s cumu-
lative production experience, measured by its capital stock, i.e., ϕt ≡ ϕ(ks
t).If nobody in the economy produces sophisticated goods, the productivity of
the sophisticated-goods sector is zero. When the sector develops, its produc-
tivity increases. We assume that the function ϕ satisﬁes the following prop-
erties: ϕ(0) = 0, lim
k→∞
ϕ(k)=1 , ϕ  (k) > 0, lim
k→0
ϕ  (0) = ∞, lim
k→∞
ϕ  (k)=0 .
The assumption that learning-by-doing spillovers are limited by national bor-
ders (national spillovers) is also adopted in, e.g., Bardhan (1970), Krugman
(1987), Lucas (1988). The models of international trade and endogenous
growth that use the assumption of boundedness of learning-by-doing oppor-
tunities include, e.g., Stockey (1991), Young (1991).8
In our model, we interpret the production of primitive goods as tradi-
tional natural-resource-based production in real economies, such as agricul-
ture, food and the primary-goods production. Thus, natural resources in
our model are endowments of any inputs that are heavily used in natural-
resource-based production (i.e., land, sea, fuel, ore). Likewise, we interpret
the production of sophisticated goods in the model as modern industrial pro-
duction in real economies, such as manufacturing and, in particular, high-tech
industry.
3.2 Equilibrium conditions
De ﬁnition: An equilibri um in the economy (4 )− (11) is deﬁne d as a s e que nc e
of the individual quantities {ct,k t,ks
t}
∞
























t=0 solves the proﬁt - max i mi z a t i o n p r obl e m (11);
(iv) the economy’s resource constraint is satisﬁed. (The resource con-
straint depends on whether the economy is closed or open and will be speci-
8See Grossman and Helpman (2003) for a discussion of models of international trade
with learning-by-doing.ﬁed separately).





































[rt − δ − ρ], (14)
which correspond to the two corner solutions and the interior solution, respec-





































3.3 An autarkic economy
If an economy is in autarky, it cannot trade either primitive or sophisticated
goods on international market. Thus, sophisticated goods in the autarkiceconomy can only be produced from its home-made primitive goods. Ac-



















Since agents can consume only sophisticated goods, and these cannot be
bought on the international market, the sophisticated-goods production is
non-zero, ks
t  =0 . Furthermore, since the production of sophisticated goods
requires the use of primitive goods as an input, the primitive-goods pro-
duction is also non-zero, k
p
t  =0 . Thus, the optimal allocation is interior
in autarky, and both sectors are developed from the beginning. Substitut-
















− δkt − ct. (20)
According to (14), i n the interior equilibrium, the interest rate on capital
in both sectors is equal, r
p
t = rs














































β − βα+ α
kt.( 2 2 )
That is, both types of capital, k
p
t and ks
t,a r ei nﬁxed proportions to the total











θ ≡ β (1 − α)B
1−αAN
(1−β)(1−α) αα [β (1 − α)]
β−βα−1
(β − βα+ α)
−(1−β)(1−α). (24)By substi tuti ng the e qui l i bri um i nterest rate (23) in the Eul er equati on (14)
and the formulas for k
p
t and ks






























t − δkt − ct. (26)
A steady state is deﬁn e da sas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ha l lt h em o d e l ’ sv a r i a b l e s




kt =0 ,s ot h a t
























t − δkt. (28)
Due to the presence of externalities, equation (27) c an have mul t i pl e s o l ut i o ns
and thus, our economy can have multiple steady states. To rule out the
multiplicity of steady states, we assume that the marginal productivity of
capital (interest rate), r(kt ),deﬁned i n (23) ha s t he s a me pro p e r t i e s a s one
under the standard neoclassical production function, i.e.,
r(kt) > 0,r





(In the standard case, the properties of r(kt ) listed in (29) resul t from the
assumptions that the production function is strictly increasing, strictly con-
cave and s ati sﬁes the Inada condi tions). In fact, the assumptions i n (29) not
only guarantee the uniqueness of the steady state but also insure that the
dyna mi c s ys t e m (25), (26 ) i s s a ddl e p at h s t a bl e .
We shall summarize our results with the following proposition:Proposition 1 (a) If an equilibrium exists in the autarkic economy, then,
it is interior, i.e., both the primitive- and sophisticated-goods sectors are de-
veloped from the beginning.
(b) Assume (29). Then, t he autarkic economy has a uni que equi l i brium path
which asymptotically converges to a steady state.
We describe the steady state of the autarkic economy in a subsequent
section, as it coincides with one of the steady states of the open economy.
3 . 4 A no p e ne c o n o m y
If an economy is open, it need not consume all of the domestically produced
goods but can trade some of them on the international market. We shall
assume that the domestic country is small, so that its trade has no eﬀect
on the world price, and that the world price is constant, pt = p for all t.
Furthermore, we shall assume that capital is immobile, so that there is no
i nt erna t i o nal b o r rowi ng a nd l endi ng. By c ombi ni ng (15)− (19 ) and (5),we

















− δkt − ct. (30)
We can establish the country’s international specialization by looking
at condition (18), whi ch yi e l ds us t he a mo unt of pri mi t i ve g o o ds us e d f or














t, then the country produces mostly primitive goods exchanging
primitive goods in the amount (y
p
t − zt) for sophisticated goods. If, on oppo-
site, zt >y
p
t, then the country produces mostly sophisticated goods. Finally,
if zt = y
p
t,t h ec o u n t r yd o e sn o tt r a d eg o o d so nt h ei n t e r n a t i o n a lm a r k e t .Ac c ordi ng to t he Ku hn- Tucke r co ndi t i ons (12 )− (14 ), t he co unt r y cho o s es
from three diﬀerent international specializations, namely, to produce either
only sophisticated goods, or only primitive goods or both kinds of goods,






















−1 (1 − α)
 (1−α)/α . (33)
Condition (33) follows after substituting (31) in (17).
Note that the corner solution, to produce only sophisticated goods, is not
an equilibrium. Indeed, if all capital is concentrated in the sophisticated-






t)=∞,s ot h a tap r i c e -
taking agent can increase the period’s capital income by re-investing from
the sophisticated- to primitive-goods sector, which means that the strategy
k
p
t =0is not utility-maximizing. In contrast, the other corner solution,
to produce only primitive goods, is an equilibrium. To see this, note that
if all capital is invested in the primitive-goods sector, we have rs (0) = 0,
so that a unilateral deviation of a price-taking agent from the equilibrium
strategy ks
t =0reduces the agent’s period capital income. Finally, note




and thus, any distribution of capital between the sectors is consistent with
the utility-maximization of a price-taking agent. Hence, our economy has
multiple equilibria, which is a result of increasing returns to scale at the
aggregate level.
At low levels of economic development, an interior solution is not feasible
since the rate of return on capital in the primitive-goods sector is higher than
the one in the sophisticated-goods sector, independently of how the total










t ∈ (0,k t]). Hence, a low-capital country
produces only primitive goods.
When the country accumulates a suﬃciently large capital stock, it may
switch to the interior solution (14). Let us es t a bl i s h a mi ni ma l va l ue f o r a g-
gregate capital stock, k, for which the interior solution is feasible. The equal-
ity of the sectorial interest rates, together wi th (32) and (33), determi nes t he









αA1/α [p−1 (1 − α)]
(1−α)/α ≡ ξ. (34)
We deﬁne  (kt ) asthemaximumvaluethattheleftsideof (34) can achieve
for a given value of kt,i . e . ,














Given that   is a strictly increasing, continuous function with  (0) = 0 and
that lim
kt→∞
 (kt)=∞, we conclude that there exists a unique threshold value




= ξ. As the equilibrium is
interior by assumption, we can characterize the threshold value by means of
the ﬁrs t - orde r c ondi t i on of (35),








=( 1− β)α. (36)
By solving the system of two equati ons, (34) and (36 ), wi th resp ect to two
unknowns, kt and k
p
t, we obtain the threshold aggregate capital stock, k,a n d
the optimal size of the primitive-goods sector, k
p
. The solution is situated in
the point where rp (k
p
t) and rs (kt − k
p
t) are tangent, which is illustrated in
Figure4.
Finally, when the country develops beyond the threshold level, kt > k,
there are two d iﬀerent i nt eri o r s ol uti ons to equati on (34).Thus,athighlevels of development, the country has to choose among three alternatives,
namely, one corner solution and two interior solutions (see Figure4).
Due to the presence of multiple solutions, our open economy has inde-
terminacy of equilibrium, in the sense that it can switch between the three
solutions in an arbitrary manner at any point of time. We must emphasize,
however, that switching among solutions is not a fundamental property of
our model, but rather, a result of our simplifying assumption that capital can
be costlessly and instantaneously transferred from one sector to another. We
would not have switching between solutions in a more realistic environment,
where the re-allocation of capital between sectors is costly. We therefore
restrict our attention to a case in which the economy sticks to the same
solution until a coordinating agent, e.g., government, enforces a switch to
another solution. We refer to the equilibrium dynamic paths corresponding
to the corner and two interior solutions as Equilibria I, II, III.
In particular, we are interested in the case where the price p in the open
economy is equal to the steady state price in the autarkic economy considered
in Section 4. This assumption allows us to compare the steady states of the
autarkic and the open economies. A steady state value of a variable x in the
autarkic economy is denoted by x∗
A . By expressing zt from (17), substituting
it in (18) and by exploiting the fact that the steady state interest rate i s











(1 − α). (37)
In the open economy, steady state values of a variable x in Equilibria I, II,
III are denoted by x∗
I, x∗
II, x∗
III, respectively. We describe the three equilibria
in the open economy below.
Equilibrium I (Poverty-trap equilibrium). The country produces only
primitive goods. As such, its dynamic behavior is described by the budget
constrai nt (30) wi t h zt =0and by the Eu l e r e quat i o n (13) wi t h r 
p
t beinggi ven by (15). The resul ti ng s ystem i s s addle path s tabl e and reaches a










I =0 . (38)
We refer to this equilibrium as the ”poverty-trap” because a low developed
country, that only produces primitive goods, might be unable to accumulate
the threshold capital stock, k, necessary for opening the sophisticated-goods
sector, thus, remaining poor forever.
Equilibrium II (Autarky-like equilibrium). The country produces both
kinds of goods; it shrinks its sophisticated-goods sector and expands its
primitive-goods sector in its process of economic development. The dynamics
of such an economy are described by the budget constraint, obtained after




t being deﬁne d i n (32) and (33 ), resp ectively. I n the li mi t, the economy























where the steady-state size of the sophisticated-goods sector is determined
by the equality of the interest rates i n (32 ) and (33). We call this equi librium
”autarky-like”, because if p = p∗
A, the open economy has the same steady
state allocation as the autarkic economy does.9 Indeed, given that the steady
state i nterest rate i n b oth economi es is equal to (δ +ρ),accordingto(15 ),
we obtain that both economies have the same capital stock in the primitive-
goods sector. Furthermore, by substituting ξ and p∗
A from (34) and (37 ),
9In spite of having the same steady state, the autarkic economy and the open econ-
omy in Equilibrium II have diﬀerent equilibrium dynamics. In particular, in the autarkic
economy, the price changes with time, whereas in the open economy, it is constant.respectively, into k
s,∗
II in (39), we s how t hat b o t h e c ono mi es have t h e s ame
capital stock in the sophisticated-goods sector.
Equilibrium III (Growth-miracle equilibrium). This is the interior equi-
librium in which the primitive-goods sector is shrinking and the sophisticated-
goods sector is expanding during the development process. The budget con-
straint and the Euler equation here coincide with those we had in Equilibrium
II. Asymptotically, the model converges to the standard AK-model where









−1 (1 − α)
 (1−α)/α ≡ A.( 4 0 )
We assume that the growth rate of consumption, following from the Euler







σ [A − δ − ρ] > 0. (This is always
t h ec a s eu n d e rp = p∗




A ) > δ + ρ). Therefore, the
economy asymptotically converges to a balanced growth path, where, accord-
ing to (34 ), the capi tal sto ck of the pri mi tive-go o ds sector i s constant, whil e



















With the term ”growth-miracle” that we employ for this equilibrium, we
emphasize that it is possible to have eternal growth in the open economy, in
contrast to the autarkic economy, where long-run growth is not feasible.
The results obtained for the open economy are summarized below:
Proposition 2 Let k be the threshold capital stock of the open economy de-
ﬁned by (34 ), (36).
(a) Under kt < k, the economy produces only primitive goods.
(b) Under kt = k, the sophisticated-goods sector can be opened. If so,k
s
= k − k
p
is transferred to the sophisticated-goods sector and k
p
is left
in the primitive-goods sector, where k 
p 
is determined by (36).
(c) Under kt > k, there are three diﬀerent equilibria.
Eq. I. The economy only has a primitive-goods sector and it asymptotically
converges to the st eady stat e (38).
Eq. II. The economy expands the primitive-goods sector and diminishes
the sophisticated-goods sector; it asymptotically converges to the steady state
(39).
Eq. III. The economy expands the sophisticated-goods and reduces the primitive-
goods sector; it as ymptotical l y converges to a bal anced growth path (41).
Equilibria I, II, II can be ranked by welfare. For any given initial capital
k0 ≥ k, we have that the interest rate in Equilibrium III is larger than the one
in Equilibrium II, which in turn, is larger than the one in Equilibrium I, for
all t. According to the Euler equation, a larger interest rate implies a larger
consumption growth rate. Hence, Equilibrium III dominates Equilibrium II,
which in turn, dominates Equilibrium I in the level of utility.10
4 Accounting for the stylized facts
In this section, we argue that our model is consistent with the stylized facts
documented in Section 2. We shall start by presenting the view of the postwar
worldwide economic development, as our model suggests. Following Atkeson
and Kehoe (2000), we assume that diﬀerent countries begin their economic
development at diﬀerent dates. To be speciﬁc, we consider the world as being
10As far the issue of stability is concerned, all our equilibria are stable to deviations of
one agent from the equilibrium strategy, as such deviations have no eﬀect on prices. If
we consider deviations that aﬀect prices, Equilibrium II will be unstable because of the
Marshallian tatonnement argument (see Matsuyama, 1991). One can make Equilibrium
II stable in the latter sense by introducing adjustment costs as in Graham and Temple
(2003).composed of two groups of countries: i.e., the early-blooming group, consist-
ing of both autarkic and open economies that have reached the autarky-like
steady state (39) a nd t he l a te - bl o omi ng gro up, co ns i s t i ng o f op e n e c ono mi es
that have just begin to develop. We assume that the late-blooming group is
small, relative to the early-blooming group, so that the choices of the late-
bloomers do not aﬀect the world price, which is equal to the steady state
pri c e i n t he e arl y- bl o omi ng co unt r i e s (37 ).
For the world economy, the implications of our model are the same as
for the autarkic economy in Section 4. In particular, we have that long-run
growth is impossible at the world level. Indeed, there are decreasing returns
to primitive-goods production because the available amount of one of the
production factors, natural resources, is ﬁxed. Given that primitive goods
are used as inputs for producing sophisticated goods, in equilibrium, we also
have (asymptotically) decreasing returns to sophisticated-goods production,
as f o rmul a (19) shows. Hence, nearly all the world economi es end up i n an
autarky-like steady state, as our early-blooming group does.
According our model, a small open economy does not need to share a
common destiny: it can do either worse than, as good as, or better than the
world in general does, depending on the sort of equilibrium it has. Below, we
argue that the three groups of countries distinguished in Section 2, namely,
the poor, rich and fast-growing groups, can be viewed as being situated in
Equilibria I, II, and III, respectively.
First, as follows from our model, being a small open economy is a curse
if the poverty-trap equilibrium (Equilibrium I) is chosen. Such an economy
produces only primitive goods and exchanges them for sophisticated goods
on the international market, and it converges to the poverty-trap steady state
with a lower consumption (welfare) than the world’s average. The features
of ten late-blooming African countries from our poor group seem to ﬁtt h e
above description.Secondly, our model predicts that a small open economy can reach the
world’s average if it mimics the behavior of the autarkic economy by choosing
Equilibrium II. Such an economy produces both primitive and sophisticated
commodities, and it converges to the autarky-like steady state with no trade
on the international market.11 The above description seems to suit the rich
early-blooming countries in the data. Note that our rich group includes
both large developed economies (like the U.S., Japan, Canada) and small
developed economies (like Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Denmark). In fact,
our model is consistent with this empirical observation: one can view large
developed economies as being in autarky, and one can view small developed
economies as open economies being in Equilibrium II.
Finally, according to our model, being a small open economy becomes
a blessing if it produces mostly sophisticated goods (Equilibrium III), and
exchanges them for primitive goods on the international market. Such an
economy has positive long-run growth, i.e., it becomes a growth-miracle.
Eternal growth is possible for a small open economy because it can buy
primitive goods used in the production of sophisticated goods at a constant
world price p, and hence, has constant returns to scale in the production
of sophisticated goods. A distinctive property of Equilibrium III is that
t h ec o u n t r y ’ ss h a r eo fp r i m i t i v e - g o o d s production decreases and that of its
sophisticated-goods production increases over time. The above features are
indeed characteristic of the fast-growing countries in the data.12
11To be precise, in the autarky-like steady state, there is no trade of primitive goods
for sophisticated goods or vise versa. Note that exchange of one primitive (sophisticated)
good for another primitive (sophisticated) good is not considered to be ”trade” in our
model, as we do not have diﬀerent primitive (sophisticated) goods. Hence, our model
is consistent with the observation that the developed countries are both importers and
exporters of sophisticated goods (see Table 3 )a sl o n ga st h e i rn e te x p o r t( i m p o r t )i sz e r o .
12In addition, the prediction of our model, that the fast-growing countries would have
increasing returns to scale in the early stages of development and constant returns to scale
in recent years, is consistent with the empirical evidence on the East Asian economies,
documented by Park and Ryu (2003). Furthermore, this study ﬁnds that the East Asian5M a k i n g a m i r a c l e
According to our theory, diﬀerent countries show distinct types of economic
performance because they have selected diﬀerent sorts of equilibria. In this
s e c t i o n ,w ea n a l y z et h r e ef a c t o r st h a ta r ei m p o r t a n tf o rt h ec h o i c eo fag i v e n
type of equilibrium, speciﬁcally: their endowment of capital, their endow-
ment of natural resources and their government’s economic policy. We argue
that these factors are indeed relevant in explaining the diﬀerent development
experiences of actual economies.
5.1 Escaping the poverty trap
In the absence of externalities, ϕ(k)=1for all k, a small open economy
has an AK-type of technology for producing sophisticated goods. As there
are decreasing returns to the primitive-goods production, such an economy
will open the sophisticated-goods sector once the marginal productivity of
capital in the primitive-goods sector reaches the constant productivity of the
sophisticated-goods sector. Starting from this point, we have a constant size
of the primitive-goods sector and an increasing size of the sophisticated-goods
sector, so that asymptotically, we obtain an AK model.13
With externalities, it might be that the economy never accumulates suf-
ﬁcient capital to open a sophisticated-goods sector. Indeed, it could be that
the steady state capital stock of the economy producing only primitive goods,
k
p,∗
I , is lower than the required threshold capital, k,w h i c hw a ss h o w nt ob e
necessary for launching of a sophisticated-goods sector. If this is so, the
economy is caught up in the poverty trap forever, producing only primitive
goods. This is presumably what happens to the countries in our poor group.
economic growth was due to the accumulation of physical capital, and not to technical
progress, which is also in agreement with our model.
13As was mentioned in the introduction, this implication is parallel to the one obtained
in Hansen and Prescott (2000).To escape the poverty trap, a developing country should adopt diﬀerent
policies to help it reach the threshold level k. One possibility would be to ask
for international aid, and/or, to attract foreign investment. Another possi-
bility would be to reduce the threshold level k by employing an appropriate
ﬁscal policy. For example, the government can tax primitive-goods producers
and subsidize sophisticated-goods producers: the former policy pushes down
rp (k
p
t ) in (32) a nd t he l at t e r o ne pushes up r p (k 
p
t ) in (33),sothattheir
intersection, k, is reduced.14
There are examples of developing countries that have beneﬁted from such
policies. Foreign aid gave a boost to the development of the two growth-
miracles of South Korea and Thailand. The discriminatory tax-subsidy
schemes were crucial for promoting export-oriented industries in South Ko-
rea and Japan. However, there are also numerous examples of developing
countries (especially, in Latin America) that received large foreign help and
did very poorly afterwards. Our model suggests the following explanation to
this phenomenon: in order to become a growth miracle, a country should not
only accumulate the threshold amount of capital but should also coordinate
on the right equilibrium. We discuss this issue in Section 5.4.
5.2 Natural resources
We shall now analyze the role of natural resources in economic development.













14An economy ruled by a benevolent central planner (dictator) has a greater chance of
escaping from the poverty trap than a market economy does. First, the planner internalizes
externalities and, thus, faces a lower threshold k, and secondly, the planner can adopt
development strategies that are not feasible in a market economy, such as developing its
sophisticated-goods sector when it is still unproﬁtable or to go beyond the (poverty-trap)
steady state of the primitive-goods sector.That is, as the amount of natural resources, N , i ncreases, b oth the steady-
state capital sto ck i n Equilibrium I, k
∗,p
I , and the threshold capital sto ck,
k , i nc re a s e, but t he f ormer grows f as t e r t ha n t he l a t te r do es . He n ce , un-
de r a s uﬃcientl y l arge N ,wehavek
∗,p
I > k , which implies that a country
wi th abundant natural resources i s abl e to accumul a te enough capi tal i n t he
primitive-go o ds sector to l aunch the sophisticated- go o ds sector. The converse
is also true: a country with scarce natural resources i s never able to reach the
threshol d necessary for l aunching a sophi sticated-go o ds sector. Thus, i n the
absence of i nternational aid, onl y countries that are rich i n natural resources
have any chance of developing.
If international aid is available but limited, abundant natural resources
coul d b ecome an obstacle f or growth. Indeed, as follows from (42),the
threshold capital stock, k, for countries with abundant natural resources is
larger than that for countries with scarce natural resources. In particular,
in the limit, we have lim
N→0
k → 0. Therefore, a country with few natural
resources can reach its threshold level k with little international aid, as op-
posed to a country with great natural resources, which needs a relatively
large international aid to do so.
Consequently, the eﬀect of natural resources on growth, in our model, is
dual: on one hand, the richness in natural resources increases the produc-
tion possibilities of the country, but on the other hand, it incentivates the
production of primitive goods excessively and distracts the economic agents
from more sophisticated and more eﬃcient production alternatives. These
predictions of our model are to much extent similar to those of Matsuyama’s
(1992) model if variations in the agricultural productivity in the latter model
are interpreted as variations in the endowment of natural resources in our
model.15
15The dual role of natural resources in economic development is also emphasized in
Guilló and Pérez (2003) in the context of the standard neo c lassical two-sector growth
The model’s implication about the dual role of natural resources in eco-
nomic growth appears to be in agreement with the data.16 The fast-growing
countries are generally short of natural resources. This is particularly true
for the Four East Asian dragons (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan) and Malta. The most outstanding of them, Singapore, started with
greater adversities than the other three dragons, and is now the most devel-
oped country among them. Malta has no rivers, no minerals, no domestic
energy sources and poor soil. As reported in Gylfason and Zoega (2001),
in Japan, Thailand, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, natural resources make up
0.8%, 6.5%, 7.2%, 8.6%, 12.4% of national wealth, respectively, which also
points to the fact that the fast-growers are resource-poor. (For the other
fast-growers, the corresponding reliable data are not available). The above
countries, however, managed to overcome their resource constraints by de-
veloping large export-oriented manufacturing sectors. In contrast, the poor
slow-growing countries identiﬁed earlier are very rich in terms of natural re-
sources: in all these countries, natural resources represent more than 15% of
their national wealth (an exception is Malawi, where this ﬁgure is slightly
lower); remarkably, in Sierra Leone, Chad, Madagascar and Niger, natural
resources represent 28%, 37%, 42% and 54% of national wealth, respectively;
see Gylfason and Zoega (2001). These resource-rich countries export raw
materials and agricultural products in exchange for more sophisticated man-
ufacturing goods, so that their own production of sophisticated goods remains
underdeveloped. At the same time, the example of two ”African growth mir-
acles”, Oman and Botswana, demonstrates that abundant natural resources
can be a boost rather than an obstacle to growth. (Oman and Botswana
are exceptionally rich in fuel and diamonds, respectively). The success of
model with ﬁxed sector-speciﬁc inputs.
16The empirical literature that studies the relationship between the richness in nat-
ural resources and economic growth includes, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995), Gylfason,
Herbertsson and Zoega (1999), Gylfason and Zoega (2001).these two countries is explained by their strategy of investing income from
the exportation of natural resources to initiate industrialization.
5.3 The coordinating role of government
The key implication of our model is that the economic performance of a small
open economy depends crucially on which type of equilibrium it selects. As
we argued in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, some countries can converge more easily to
a good equilibrium than others, because of their larger capital endowment or
their greater wealth in natural resources. However, even the most favorable
initial conditions do not guarantee that a country will become a growth
miracle. Only those countries that manage to coordinate on the growth-
miracle equilibrium will do so.
The government is a natural candidate for performing the coordinating
role. The importance of the government’s policy on economic development
can be seen clearly by looking at the experience of the fast-growing countries.
In Singapore, the basic industrialization program was initiated and managed
by the government; in particular, the government consulted a UN develop-
ment expert, who recommended the rapid build up of the manufacturing
sector. In South Korea, with the military takeover in 1961, economic policy
changed from reconstruction and import substitution to the aggressive pro-
motion of exportation. The economic expansion of Malaysia was urged on by
the government in the late 1960s, by initiating its import-substitution indus-
trialization program in heavy industry. The Japanese government played an
important coordinating role in overcoming the market failures that inhibited
the economy’s structural transformation.17 Malta h a sb a s e di t se c o n o m i c
17Rodrik (1996, p.19) also emphasizes the importance of the governments’ coordination
for successful economic performance of the fast-growing East Asian countries: ”... the
governments of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan played an active role in coordinating,
subsidizing, and guiding private investment decisions. This active role was implemented
through the governments’ control over the allocation of credit, through tax and othergrowth on the promotion of the exportation of manufactured goods (as well
as tourism). In the case of Botswana, the source of its growth was min-
eral wealth, which the Botswana’s government was able to transform into
long-term growth by channelling funds into the development of manufactur-
ing. Another fast-growing country with rich natural resources, Oman,h a s
had a similar experience: income generated from the exportation of natural
resources was used for the development of physical and social infrastructure.
A crucial role of government in the process of economic development
can be also appreciated by comparing the experience of Botswana with that
of Sierra Leone, another African country that exports diamonds. As was
discussed above, Botswana now has a high-performance economy because
its government was able to take advantage of its wealth in diamonds by
implementing the adequate economic policy. In contrast, Sierra Leone is
one of the poorest countries in the world, mainly because its government was
unable to stop a domestic conﬂict that originated over its rich diamond supply
and which destroyed the country’s infrastructure and social institutions.
China is another example of a government that played a key role in initi-
ating and promoting economic development. The Chinese government imple-
mented a gradual transition from a command economy to a market economy,
generally maintaining its old institutions and slowly reshaping them to meet
the needs of its market economy. In particular, as a ﬁr s ts t e p ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
introduced market forces in agriculture and only after agriculture had been
suﬃciently developed, began the necessary reforms in industry. In fact, this
development strategy is precisely what leads to a growth-miracle equilibrium
in our model: It, ﬁrst, accumulates the threshold amount of capital in the
primitive-goods sector and then, it switches to a growth-miracle equilibrium
by shifting the resources to the sophisticated-goods sector.
incentives, administrative guidance, and when all else failed, public enterprises”.6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a two-sector model of international trade and economic
growth with the aim of explaining postwar international growth experiences.
The open-economy variant of our model has multiple equilibria because one
of the production sectors has increasing returns to scale. Depending on the
equilibrium chosen, a small open economy can do either worse, as good as,
or better than the world average. These model’s implications are consistent
with the tendencies that we observe in the data since 1950s , namely, that
the initially rich nations have remained rich, most of the poor nations have
remained poor and some of the poor nations have become growth miracles.
We emphasize the importance of government interventions in a country’s
successful economic performance by arguing that an appropriate policy can
help the economy coordinate on a superior equilibrium.
As a ﬁnal comment, we should point out one important limitation to our
analysis. We take a rather simpliﬁed view of the world economy by assuming
that it is composed of developed autarkic economies which determine world
prices and of small developing open economies which have no eﬀect on world
prices. In reality, world prices arise as an outcome of the interactions among
all countries, and, in particular, are aﬀected by the actions of developing
countries. This fact is potentially important for the properties of equilibrium
in the world economy. One implication of our model that will not survive
the introduction of fully endogenous price determination is that a small open
economy can grow forever. Indeed, eternal growth is possible for a small open
economy because it faces constant prices. However, as such an economy grows
larger, it starts aﬀecting world prices, so that its growth must slow down.
(Presumably, this eﬀect accounts for the slow-down in the Japanese growth
rate during the last decade). To address this and other similar issues, one has
to set up a multi-country general equilibrium model of international tradeand economic growth. A characterization of equilibrium in such a model is,
in general, a diﬃcult task. One possible way of proceeding in this direction
would be to employ the aggregation theory, see, e.g., Caselli and Ventura
(2000), and Maliar and Maliar (2003).
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tional trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 369-405.Table 1. Rankings of countries by GDP per capita in 1960 and in 1999 and by GDP growth over 1960-1999.  
 
Year 1960  Year 1999 
Country 





















Botswana  0.0025  343.57 82  0.0207  3611.00 45  10.5102  1 
Singapore  0.0669  2698.90 33  0.3583  25297.00 14  9.3731  2 
South  Korea  0.4764  1255.60 47  1.8748  11022.00 28  8.7783  3 
Malta  0.0059 1177.30  48  0.0137 9759.50  29  8.2897  4 
Oman  0.0059  696.31 60  0.0575  5704.19 35  8.1920  5 
Hong Kong, China  0.1398  3007.60  29  0.5308  21801.00  17  7.2486  6 
China  1.1310 111.73  99  3.2980 724.73  72  6.4864  7 
Thailand  0.1866  465.92 73  0.5758  2628.50 50  5.6415  8 
Japan  11.7274  8213.50  17  19.5822  42285.00 3  5.1482 9 
Malaysia  0.1204  975.00 53  0.3559  4379.90 41  4.4922 10 
Portugal  0.3715  2737.30 32  0.4373  11976.00 27  4.3751 11 
Ireland  0.2347  5461.90 20  0.3149  23154.00 15  4.2392 12 
Indonesia  0.3556  249.34 87  0.7272  974.63 66  3.9088 13 
Greece 0.4257  3368.70 27  0.4726  12269.00 25  3.6421 14 
Mauritius  0.0112  1122.20 50  0.0171  4034.50 42  3.5952 15 
Puerto  Rico  0.1204  3364.00 28  0.1701  12008.95 26  3.5698 16 
Spain  2.1352  4620.40 23  2.3642  16391.00 23  3.5475 17 
Norway  0.6117 11256.00  7  0.6016 37053.00  4  3.2918  18 
Hungary  0.2293  1513.60 42  0.1818  4907.80 37  3.2425 19 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  0.1415  359.67 79  0.2578  1143.60 63  3.1796 20 
Luxembourg  0.0754 15772.00  3  0.0775 49620.00  1  3.1461  21 
Israel  0.1686  5256.30 22  0.3597  16466.00 22  3.1326 22 
Lesotho  0.0022  168.47 96  0.0039  511.66 77  3.0371 23 
Italy  5.0629  6646.50 19  4.2005  19911.00 20  2.9957 24 
Finland  0.6646  9886.80 14  0.5523  29257.00 10  2.9592 25 
Iceland  0.0271 10135.00  12  0.0299 29809.00  8  2.9412  26 
Austria  1.1417 10675.00  9  0.9163 30962.00  6  2.9004  27 
Sri  Lanka  0.0412  274.83 86  0.0543  789.30 70  2.8720 28 
Belice  0.0013  976.90 52  0.0024  2742.30 49  2.8071 29 
Seychelles  0.0016  2563.00 34  0.0021  7176.50 32  2.8000 30 
Pakistan  0.1257  180.66 94  0.2412  500.38 78  2.7697 31 
Belgium  1.4854 10735.00  8  1.0846 29016.00  11  2.7029  32 
Barbados  0.0102  2923.90 30  0.0077  7895.00 31  2.7002 33 
Chile  0.2272  1968.00 35  0.2849  5246.60 36  2.6660 34 
France  7.3557  10611.00 10  6.0421  28243.00 13  2.6617 35 
Dominican  Rep.  0.0335  682.56 61  0.0545  1801.70 54  2.6396 36 
Gabon  0.0134  1810.70 39  0.0206  4768.10 38  2.6333 37 
Brazil  1.9228  1741.50 40  2.7340  4500.80 40  2.5844 38 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0.0329  475.16 72  0.0677  1206.60 62  2.5394 39 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.0242  1890.90 37  0.0219  4651.00 39  2.4597 40 
Netherland  2.0916 11999.00  6  1.6846 29293.00  9  2.4413  41 
India  1.2080  183.07 93  1.5449  430.46 81  2.3513 42 
Australia  1.5416  9887.20 13  1.5677  22821.00 16  2.3081 43 
United States  36.4050 13279.00  5  30.3477 30135.00  7  2.2694  44 
Denmark  1.1322 16287.00  2  0.7159 36864.00  5  2.2634  45 
Canada  2.5668  9329.94 16  2.3232  20967.00 18  2.2473 46 
Panama  0.0250  1462.50 43  0.0325  3206.10 48  2.1922 47 
United  Kingdom  7.5467  9495.90 15  4.4976  20718.00 19  2.1818 48 
Colombia  0.2825  1104.20 51  0.3594  2404.40 52  2.1775 49 
Mexico  0.9189  1639.00 41  1.2352  3539.90 46  2.1598 50 
Sweden  1.5199 13390.00  4  0.9338 28796.00  12  2.1506  51 
Paraguay  0.0249  889.58 55  0.0342  1787.20 55  2.0090 52 
Ecuador  0.0523  776.68 57  0.0696  1559.80 58  2.0083 53 
Morocco  0.1229  696.40 59  0.1416  1391.80 61  1.9986 54 
Costa  Rica  0.0344  1934.60 36  0.0486  3765.40 44  1.9463 55 
Saudi  Arabia  0.2330  3767.70 25  0.4952  6866.00 33  1.8223 56 
Fiji  0.0084  1400.40 44  0.0072  2475.90 51  1.7680 57 
Papua  New  Guinea  0.0165  565.15 67  0.0168  998.59 65  1.7669 58 
Switzerland  2.1355 26245.00  1  1.1718 44988.00  2  1.7142  59 Kenya  0.0254  201.20 92  0.0358  339.48 88  1.6873 60 
Uruguay  0.1492  3873.00 24  0.0778  6460.90 34  1.6682 61 
Guatemala  0.0558  928.30 54  0.0606  1531.10 60  1.6494 62 
Mauritania  0.0044  293.87 83  0.0044  476.87 79  1.6227 63 
Bahamas,  The  0.0134  7842.40 18  0.0137  12696.00 24  1.6189 64 
Bangladesh  0.1697  217.46 91  0.1613  350.38 86  1.6112 65 
New  Zealand  0.3728  10356.00 11  0.2301  16564.00 21  1.5995 66 
Congo,  Rep.  0.0084  557.32 68  0.0091  889.85 68  1.5967 67 
Philippines  0.2975  711.40 58  0.3000  1123.80 64  1.5797 68 
Malawi  0.0052 97.79  100  0.0059  154.09 97  1.5757 69 
Zimbabwe  0.0264  455.59 75  0.0306  715.34 74  1.5701 70 
Argentina  1.6965  5423.20 21  1.1214  8473.60 30  1.5625 71 
Burkina Faso  0.0119  169.13 95  0.0102  258.66 90  1.5294 72 
Nepal  0.0208  147.66 97  0.0183  218.79 95  1.4817 73 
Togo  0.0053  230.20 88  0.0054  328.11 89  1.4253 74 
Honduras  0.0147  513.17 71  0.0163  721.70 73  1.4064 75 
South  Africa  0.7472  2830.60 31  0.5948  3921.80 43  1.3855 76 
Algeria  0.1876  1145.00 49  0.1667  1541.80 59  1.3466 77 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.0337  587.02 66  0.0436  786.45 71  1.3397 78 
El  Salvador  0.0513  1310.40 46  0.0382  1727.40 56  1.3182 79 
Peru  0.2823  1873.10 38  0.2139  2353.70 53  1.2566 80 
Cameroon  0.0416  518.24 70  0.0338  645.53 75  1.2456 81 
Jamaica  0.0346  1398.00 45  0.0162  1712.00 57  1.2246 82 
Guyana  0.0058  676.95 62  0.0026  824.44 69  1.2179 83 
Bolivia  0.0420  826.66 56  0.0283  972.24 67  1.1761 84 
Burundi  0.0057  128.09 98  0.0035  147.25 99  1.1496 85 
Nigeria  0.1385  223.53 89  0.1123  253.70 91  1.1350 86 
Benin  0.0109  350.65 80  0.0086  393.90 83  1.1233 87 
Venezuela  0.4279  3720.50 26  0.3006  3531.00 47  0.9491 88 
Ghana  0.0462  449.53 76  0.0270  401.28 82  0.8927 89 
Senegal  0.0324  670.38 63  0.0191  577.51 76  0.8615 90 
Rwanda  0.0115  276.28 85  0.0067  226.94 93  0.8214 91 
Chad  0.0135  289.63 84  0.0060  225.51 94  0.7786 92 
Central  African  Rep.  0.0106  457.45 74  0.0043  341.20 87  0.7459 93 
Sierra Leone  0.0075  219.33 90  0.0027  153.08 98  0.6979 94 
Nicaragua  0.0153  655.54 64  0.0079  452.22 80  0.6898 95 
Haiti  0.0316  546.91 69  0.0104  369.96 85  0.6765 96 
Madagascar  0.0312  382.67 78  0.0127  238.40 92  0.6230 97 
Zambia  0.0309  647.79 65  0.0137  387.92 84  0.5988 98 
Niger  0.0186  405.33 77  0.0081  217.52 96  0.5366 99 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.0813 349.56  81  0.0193 112.66 100  0.3223 100 
Note: 
a GDP per capita is expressed in 1995US$. 




Ranked by GDP per capita in 1999 
 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Numbers in each column are the group-averages and numbers in parenthesis are the group-standard deviations of the 
corresponing statistics.  Table 3. The main exported and imported products for the three  groups of countries.  
 
Country Export  Import 
The rich group 
Luxembourg  machinery and equipment, steel products, chemicals, rubber 
products, glass 
minerals, metals, foodstuffs, quality consumer goods 
Switzerland  machinery, chemicals, metals, watches, agricultural products  machinery, chemicals, vehicles, metals; agricultural products, 
textiles 
Japan  motor vehicles, semiconductors, office machinery, chemicals  machinery and equipment, fuels, foodstuffs, chemicals, 
textiles, raw materials (2001) 
Norway  petroleum and petroleum products, machinery and equipment, 
metals, chemicals, ships, fish 
machinery and equipment, chemicals, metals, foodstuffs 
Denmark  machinery and instruments, meat and meat products, dairy 
products, fish, chemicals, furniture, ships, windmills 
machinery and equipment, raw materials and 
semimanufactures for industry, chemicals, grain and 
foodstuffs, consumer goods 
Austria  machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and parts, paper and 
paperboard, metal goods, chemicals, iron and steel; textiles, 
foodstuffs 
machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals, metal 
goods, oil and oil products; foodstuffs 
United 
States 
capital goods, automobiles, industrial supplies and raw 
materials, consumer goods, agricultural products 
crude oil and refined petroleum products, machinery, 
automobiles, consumer goods, industrial raw materials, food 
and beverages 
Iceland  fish and fish products 70%, animal products, aluminum, 
diatomite, ferrosilicon 
machinery and equipment, petroleum products; foodstuffs, 
textiles 
Netherland  machinery and equipment, chemicals, fuels; foodstuffs  machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, fuels; 
foodstuffs, clothing 
Finland  machinery and equipment, chemicals, metals; timber, paper, 
pulp (1999) 
foodstuffs, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, 
transport equipment, iron and steel, machinery, textile yarn 
and fabrics, grains (1999) 
The fast-growing group 
Botswana  diamonds 90%, copper, nickel, soda ash, meat, textiles  foodstuffs, machinery, electrical goods, transport equipment, 
textiles, fuel and petroleum products, wood and paper 
products, metal and metal products 
Singapore  machinery and equipment (including electronics), consumer 
goods, chemicals, mineral fuels 
machinery and equipment, mineral fuels, chemicals, 
foodstuffs 
South Korea  electronic products, machinery and equipment, motor 
vehicles, steel, ships; textiles, clothing, footwear; fish 
machinery, electronics and electronic equipment, oil, steel, 
transport equipment, textiles, organic chemicals, grains 
Malta  machinery and transport equipment, manufactures  machinery and transport equipment, manufactured and semi-
manufactured goods; food, drink, and tobacco 
Oman  petroleum, reexports, fish, metals, textiles  machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, 
food, livestock, lubricants 
Hong Kong  electrical machinery and appliances, textiles, apparel, 
footwear, watches and clocks, toys, plastics, precious stones 
foodstuffs, transport equipment, raw materials, 
semimanufactures, petroleum, plastics, machinery, electrical 
equipment; a large share is reexported 
China  machinery and equipment; textiles and clothing, footwear, 
toys and sporting goods; mineral fuels 
machinery and equipment, mineral fuels, plastics, iron and 
steel, chemicals 
Thailand  computers, transistors, seafood, clothing, rice (2000)  capital goods, intermediate goods and raw materials, 
consumer goods, fuels (2000) 
Malaysia  electronic equipment, petroleum and liquefied natural gas, 
wood and wood products, palm oil, rubber, textiles, chemicals 
(2000) 
electronics, machinery, petroleum products, plastics, vehicles, 
iron and steel products, chemicals (2000) 
The poor group 
Nigeria  petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber  machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, manufactured 
goods, food and live animals 
Madagascar  coffee, vanilla, shellfish, sugar; cotton cloth, chromite, 
petroleum products 
capital goods, petroleum, consumer goods, food 
Rwanda  coffee, tea, hides, tin ore  foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, steel, petroleum 
products, cement and construction material 
Chad  cotton, cattle, gum arabic  machinery and transportation equipment, industrial goods, 
petroleum products, foodstuffs, textiles 
Nepal  carpets, clothing, leather goods, jute goods, grain  gold, machinery and equipment, petroleum products, fertilizer 
Níger  uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions  foodstuffs, machinery, vehicles and parts, petroleum, cereals 
Malawi  tobacco 60%, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, wood 
products, apparel 
food, petroleum products, semimanufactures, consumer goods, 
transportation equipment 
Sierra Leone  diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish (1999)  foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, fuels and lubricants, 
chemicals (1995) 
Burundi  coffee, tea, sugar, cotton, hides  capital goods, petroleum products, foodstuffs 
Congo, D. R.  diamonds, copper, crude oil, coffee, cobalt  foodstuffs, mining and other machinery, transport equipment, 
fuels 
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Source: World Development Indicators (2000). 
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Figure 2. Sectorial composition of manufacturing for three groups of countries. 






















































































































































Net export of fuel, ores, food and agricalture, % of GDP
Net export of manufacturing, % of GDP                   
Source: World Development Indicators (2000). 
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